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Changing face of organised crime 
or  







What is the face of organised crime? Could it be represented by the faces 
of well-known ‘organised criminals’? Let us remind ourselves of the faces 
of American mobsters from the golden age of prohibition – dignified men 
in black suits and soft hats but with a revolver in the pocket and sometimes 
with machine-guns in the car. We may also recall the icon of those times, 
Al Capone, who was sentenced not for gangster crimes but for tax evasion, 
or Frank Costello, the so-called “Prime Minister of the Underworld”, who, 
for several decades, ruled one of the country’s major criminal gangs. He 
was brought several times to court but spent only 11 months in prison, be-
coming a well-known figure due to the Kefauver committee hearings in 
1951, but passed away tranquilly as a respectable citizen aged 91 (Kenney 
and Finckenauer, 1995).  
 Or could the face of Colombian narco-baron, Pablo Escobar, be more 
representative? The man who was at a certain time considered to be the 
richest person on earth, a man responsible for hundreds if not thousands of 
murders, yet mourned by thousands of common Colombians after he was 
killed on the run in 1993. (Thoumi, 2012)  
 Or is it the face of “white collar” such as Roberto Calvi, the Italian 
banker dubbed “God’s Banker”, suspected of financial machinations and 
money laundering whose death in 1982 has never been fully clarified? 
 Or is it the face of someone more up-to-date like the Russian “thief-in-
law” Vyacheslav Ivankov called Yaponchik, a man whose criminal activi-
ties encompassed not only post-Soviet territory but also the U.S., and who 
was assassinated on a street in Moscow in 2009?  
                                                          
1  The author is director of the ICSP (Institute of Criminology and Social Preven-
tion) Prague, Czech Republic 
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 The faces of these men are known and distinct but the underlying face 
of organised crime is indistinct and more hidden. That is why the effort to 
delineate this multi-faceted phenomenon by some unambiguous and clear 
definition has failed so often (von Lampe, 2016). The strict critic may say 
that if the exact and generally accepted definition of the phenomenon itself 
is missing the analysis of its developmental changes stands on weak 
ground. How can we describe the intended phenomenon, its initial state 
and its subsequent development without having an exact definition at 
hand? 
 But while the exact contours of organised crime are contested, there is 
at least some agreement that by observing certain phenomena, such as sys-
tematic and planned criminal activity or hierarchically structured groups of 
criminals (see Musil, 2014), something can be learned about the situation 
and development of organised crime. 
 
 
The face of organised crime in the socialist period 
 
If we look back at the development of organised crime in the Czech Re-
public we may state that it is closely linked to political, social and eco-
nomic developments during the period of transformation and the subse-
quent phase of stabilisation. It has been related not only to the phenomenon 
itself but also to its perception. 
 For the preceding period of socialist Czechoslovakia it was character-
istic that the phrase ‘organised crime’ was not used with regard to any kind 
of criminal activity. Under the dominant ideology it was simply unthinka-
ble to admit to the existence of anything like ‘organised crime’ within so-
cialist society. If anything, this category was considered as something 
transmitted by the literature and movies, something that belonged to the 
alien and specific traditions of other countries.  
 This state of affairs was reflected also by the respective law. The Czech-
oslovak penal code at that time did not know the term ‘organised crime’ 
and did not take into account the potential occurrence of such forms of 
criminality. The penal code knew only the term “organised group”  used to 
designate the cases when several offenders joined in order to commit some 
separate, concrete crime. 
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 This does not mean that from the present perception some forms of 
crime in the socialist Czechoslovakia were not organised. In fact, there 
were some forms of ‘organised’ criminal groups and activities, typically in 
such areas as the illegal exchange of foreign currency and organised pros-
titution. While not labelled ‘organised crime’ in legal parlance or in the 
common language, these manifestations bore the features of organised 
crime, with the exception of the transnational element because the borders 
were hermetically closed and all contacts with foreign countries carefully 
supervised (Scheinost, 2001: 34).  
 Offenders of this ‘socialist organised crime’ were usually individuals 
who thanks to their profession had wide-ranging contacts. Take, for exam-
ple, prostitution. The procurers were mostly taxi-drivers and receptionists 
at hotels. In contrast, those engaged in the illegal exchange of currency 
(called commonly “veksláci” from German “wechseln”) tended to be 
younger people who most often pretended to be employed, for example as  
night watchman of some object (because it was necessary to prove a legal 
source of living to avoid prosecution for so-called social parasitism). The 
public was familiar with both these activities and especially the illegal ex-
change of currency that took place openly, sometimes literally before the 
eyes of the people (and the police). Beyond any doubt these illegal activi-
ties enjoyed some tacit approval by the general public and also the police 
which balanced their willingness to look the other way with the ability to 
garner support from criminal elements, for example by recruiting prosti-
tutes as informants. 
 Another facet of the ‘grey zone’ of the economy was connected to ille-
gal or semi-legal businesses involved in the illicit distribution of scarce 
goods. However, the Czechoslovakian shadow economy never reached the 
scale and level of organisation endemic, for example, in the Soviet Union. 
Citizens coped with the shortage of consumer goods and services through 
the informal exchange networks of which every citizen was a part. 
 Those who obtained illegal profits from these activities, either as ‘or-
ganised’ or simply ‘economic’ perpetrators, were depicted in Czech litera-
ture and movies as petty law breakers, greedy individuals not satisfied with 
money earned from honest work who represented the last remnants of the 
‘petty bourgeois’ class. The ‘veksláci’, on the other hand, were presented 
as drifting young men without firm moral principles, longing for an ‘easy 
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life’. Both these types were of course in stark contrast to the propagated 
model of ‘socialist man’ (Šinkovec, 2019). 
 
 
Time of transformation 
 
So, in the eyes of the Czechoslovak public and from the point of view of 
the socialist state authorities, there was no organised crime. And where 
some organised forms of criminality did exist, these were not understood 
as such. This means that the term ‘organised crime’ did not enter the public 
conscience in the CR until the social transformations of the so-called tran-
sition period began to take hold after 1989. It is important to note that under 
the new conditions the existence of organised crime was not tied to any of 
the facets of the Soviet-Era shadow economy. After all, many of the old 
schemes, such as the black-market exchange of currency, had lost their 
meaning under the new economic and financial system. Rather, the focus 
shifted to new forms of crime that emerged in the process of transformation 
against the background of a general increase in crime. 
 Jan van Dijk and Patricia Mayhew in their study “Criminal victimisa-
tion in the industrialised world” have argued that a high crime rate is the 
price paid for living in a rich, urbanised and democratic society (van Dijk 
and Mayhew, 1993). The post-socialist countries undoubtedly aspired to 
transform themselves into such a society. However, the increase in crime, 
including new forms of serious crime, should not be viewed as a sign that 
the desired goal of transformation had been realised. Rather than marking 
the advent of a flourishing economy, the crime trends of the 1990s were an 
unwanted and unanticipated consequence of the efforts to reach that goal 
as quickly as possible. 
 All post-socialist countries experienced a radical transformation both 
economically and politically. The common denominators of the economic 
transformation were far-reaching changes through the rapid privatisation 
of state property, the redistribution and new accumulation of capital, and 
the hurried – even rushed – formation of a market economy. Although the 
opening of borders was essential for democratic and market changes, it also 
opened the door to criminal activities from the outside. New institutions 
and processes of governance and economics were introduced in states 
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where the natural development of social progress had been halted for dec-
ades. The state institutions, which bore the historical burden of public dis-
trust, were left weakened by radical changes both in the constitutional 
framework and in the composition of staff.  
 The police and judiciary were among the authorities most deeply af-
fected and undermined by these changes; and at the same time were con-
fronted with dramatically increased workloads in the face of rising crime. 
As a rule, such profound social change shakes the established norms of 
social behaviour and social regulation and leads to the emergence of a sit-
uation of ‘anomie’, as predicted by Emile Durkheim (Cejp and Scheinost, 
2012). And anomie increases the inclination of individuals to commit 
crimes especially when the new conditions create environments and fertile 
soil for crime in other ways as well. The emergence and growth of diverse 
forms of organised crime in particular where promoted in the post-socialist 
milieu.  
 When exploring the rise of organised crime in this period we may take 
into account a second theory apart from Durkheim’s Anomie Theory: the 
theory of rational choice which posits that crimes are committed when po-
tential perpetrators come to the conclusion that the benefits from crime 
outweigh the associated costs. Applied to the situation in transition coun-
tries it means that crime is an adaptation strategy chosen with the aim to 
exploit new favourable conditions quickly and effectively and with hardly 
any substantive risk due to the circumstance that laws and their enforce-
ment are also in motion and, therefore, less effective in their functioning 
(Lubelcová, 1998: 131–134).  
 This form of adaptation strategy is a reaction to changes in social con-
science. Under the former egalitarian model, when most of the people lived 
at roughly equal levels of socio-economic status, it was not useful to crop 
out too much. Rather, it was appropriate to remain at a plain level and avoid 
any unwanted attention. Individuals striving for wealth had no place in this 
model. In contrast, what was appreciated (at least formally) was the ‘right-
eous work’ for the common welfare of the collective. People striving for 
individual wealth were officially considered to be ‘bourgeois types’ inher-
ited as ‘survivals’ from the period of class-divided society. This egalitarian 
model, which had prevailed for decades under the socialist regime was 
suddenly cast aside. It was replaced by an individualistic model which has 
since shaped the social climate, colouring the process of transformation 
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and furthering a different notion of desirable social behaviour based on the 
principle of individual liberty, entrepreneurial success, and the display of 
personal wealth. The principle of competition and success has since pre-
vailed.  
 Some people and social groups have been characterised by high aspira-
tions and by their effort to accomplish a rapid vertical mobility fully taking 
advantage of new opportunities. Nevertheless this effort was often accom-
panied by impatience and by a relatively strong consumer orientation. Not 
all have been capable of fulfilling their ambitions in keeping with the law. 
Some, who with a novel vision of personal success have jumped on the 
opportunities provided by a free market economy, did so with weak moral 
standards, which is not really surprising given that under the previous re-
gime nothing had prepared them for the new situation. 
 What was especially weakened was the respect for property. Because 
nearly all property under the socialist regime was state property, it was a 
“property of all people” which meant in fact that it was anonymous and 
effectively belonged to no one. In addition, the vision of free market econ-
omy was for most people a rather obscure notion, and something like eth-
ical principles of enterprising or decent behaviour in the market place were 
remote ideas. Others found themselves marginalised due to the social 
changes and reacted with frustration to the loss of status and the inability 
to achieve prosperity (Scheinost, 1999). 
 We may add that the social atmosphere after 1989 was characterised by 
a high level of optimism. Based on research carried out in 1991, 45% of 
the people expected a rapid improvement of the social and economic situ-
ation in the near future, 40% counted on at least a moderate improvement 
(Svítková, 1992). In 1994, it was found that 33% of the population ex-
pected an improvement of their standard of living within one year, and 64% 
within five years (Mladá fronta Dnes, 1994). 
 When such high expectations come into conflict with reality, which, in 
fact, has been the case for many people, one can expect increasing pressure 
to take the risk of unlawful forms of problem solving. A rational evaluation 
of possible gains related to potential risks, together with a high desire for 
social wealth and respect, can lead to the decision to break the law. This 
theory seems to be adequate in order to explain at least in part the general 
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rise of profit-motivated crimes in the period of transformation. It is possi-
ble to recall also Agnew’s general strain theory – strains as the inability to 
achieve positively valued goals (Agnew, 2001). 
 If we try to explain the expansion of organised crime as a specific phe-
nomenon against the background of this general growth of crime, the so-
called ‘enterprise theory’ (Smith, 1980) may also prove useful. This theory 
describes the activities of criminal organisations in terms of market mech-
anisms of supply and demand. The legal market does not only fail to satisfy 
potential buyers of illegal goods and services, which is obvious, it even 
may fail to satisfy those interested in legal products and service. High de-
mand for illegal goods (such as drugs) or services (e.g. the organisation of 
illegal migration) or scarce legal goods (art items, cars), combined with 
relatively low risk and high profit, provide strong incentives for illegal 
groups to enter the market and organize the supply in accordance with de-
mand (Kenney and Finckenauer, 1994: 41). 
 This model of organised crime can be observed in various post-socialist 
countries. The rapidly emerging demand for drugs and cars (some of the 
countries in question acted as the source of the ‘product’ and others as its 
destination), the development of the sex industry, the huge numbers of ref-
ugees willing to pay for assistance in illegal migration especially during 
the Balkan wars, the expansion of the stolen arts trade, to name but a few 
‘areas of growing demand’, all created profitable opportunities from which 
criminal groups and organisations benefited. Those who were willing to 
break the law in order to take advantage of these new opportunities on the 
one side, and people forming a demand for certain commodities that were 
not offered legally, on the other, met on this field of criminal enterprising.   
 Apart from the two groups that interacted as suppliers and customers of 
illegal goods and services, there was a third group of people that did not 
offer or buy anything. They exploited opportunities for predatory enrich-
ment that came into being in the frame of the process of privatisation, in-
volving such schemes as frauds, corruption, and so-called tunneling (see 
Baloun et al., 2005). 
 This raises the question how the face of organised crime changed in 
times of transition. It is possible to distinguish  three elements shaping the 
appearance of organised crime at the time (of course as an ‘ideal model’): 
   1. Enterprising Czechs taking advantage of new opportunities that pre-
sented themselves in a process of transition marked by such factors as 
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a state of anomie, a new model of social success, weakened state insti-
tutions and law enforcement authorities, and a rushed process of privat-
isation. 
2. The Czech society with its role in creating opportunities for crime 
through the demand for certain goods (e.g., drugs, cheap cars), unsettled 
social norms and changing values leading to the higher level of toler-
ance to socially aggressive form of behaviour, trust in quick progress 
etc.  
3. The international influences in the form of a penetration by criminal en-
trepreneurs from abroad as well as a demand for illegal goods and ser-
vices from abroad.  
 
From the beginning, the attention of the public, the media and law enforce-
ment authorities focused on this third element.  
 Such a penetration from abroad of course existed and cannot be denied. 
Many factors were favourable for organised criminal activities coming 
from abroad and developed on the Czech territory: an advantageous geo-
graphical position of the CR, anticipating and preparing to join the EU, 
instability and unpreparedness of legal norms, insufficient institutions and 
personnel and lack of experience of law enforcement authorities. The CR 
quickly became the link on the traces of transnational illegal trafficking in 
diverse commodities. The Czech territory served at first as transit country 
but gradually also as target country for some commodities such as e.g. 
drugs and trafficked women. 
 Organised criminal groups coming from abroad were in the first phase 
involved in drug trafficking, illegal migration, prostitution, racketeering 
etc. as mentioned above. They were not primarily engaged in activities car-
ried out in economy sectors. The term ‘organised crime’ essentially re-
ferred to the setting and content from abroad. With regard to the Czech 
perpetrators organised crime was interpreted as some kind of incentive that 
recruits only step-by-step, domestic co-offenders, suppliers and customers. 
 Thus, organised crime within this initial period was interpreted espe-
cially in media as an imported phenomenon focused on its ‘classical’ man-
ifestations. In this conception, organised crime was commonly represented 
by the activities of more or less extensive organisations and groups often 
interconnected in transnational networks trading illegal goods and services 
or illegal trafficking in legal goods and services. These ‘usual’ forms of 
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organised crime probed in the new geographic areas for an attractive milieu 
that also encompassed newly established groups of customers, victims but 
also collaborators and co-offenders. They filled the field prepared by new 
kinds of demand or stimulated demand and offer, 
 The offender picture at this time corresponded to this usual interpreta-
tion: it was rather a foreigner coming from abroad as organiser of traffick-
ing in drugs, cars, women, transport of migrants. At the second place it was 
his Czech collaborator: the small drug dealer, car thief, burglar of castles, 
museums and churches, smuggler, driver, person providing transport and 
accommodation of migrants etc. In short, mostly people at the low level of 
organised criminal businesses as executive members and helpers. At best 
the Czech co-offenders could be people acting as contacts and counsellors 
of foreign crime-entrepreneurs who needed their experience and orienta-
tion.  
 The proportion of Czechs and foreigners has been considered for years 
by the Police to be relatively equal but as results from expertise mentioned 
below the decisive role was attributed to foreigners. Especially during 
1990s it was characteristic that organised crime was not understood as the 
product of the criminogenic potential of domestic conditions; rather it was 
presented as the misuse by organised groups penetrating from abroad. 
 Also the first governmental concept of the fight against organised crime 
(Concept, 1996) focused mostly on provisions how to hinder the penetra-
tion of organised crime from abroad.  
 Thus, this ‘branch’ of organised crime during the initial period of trans-
formation may be labelled as ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ organised crime. We 
may also designate it, in spite of high profits, as a ‘lower’ form of organised 
crime because it was connected to lower social strata at least at the execu-
tive level. 
 But if we want to understand organised forms of crime we cannot 
neglect changes in the legal economy, it means that it is necessary to have 
a look to new opportunities opened for new perpetrators in the process of 
transition. It is obvious that the period of transformation provided fertile 
grounds for the rise of criminal activities in the corporate and financial 
fields, in particular with regard to the process of privatisation of state 
property, the development of private enterprising, and the transfer of 
capital, all within an environment characterised by a lack of market 
regulation with new laws being developed and adopted only gradually and 
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sometimes belatedly (Baloun et al., 2005). Under such favourable 
conditions, several forms of organised illegal or semi-legal activities began 
to grow. Initially they were not called and presented as organised crime. In 
fact, for a relatively long time they did not attract any special attention, and 
they were not visibly connected with existing criminal organisations. 
Those cases that came to light concerned large privatisation investment 
funds such as V. Kozeny’s Harvard Investment Funds, the Trend fund, or 
CS Funds which took advantage of coupon privatisation to amass huge 
quantities of investors’ assets and, through a range of different financial 
operations, to misappropriate these assets. 
 Offenders coming from abroad also took part in these activities by 
investment of illegal profits, mostly into real estate or restaurants, but the 
substantial part of this kind of crime should be attributed to Czech 
offenders. In contrast with the above mentioned first ‘branch’, these forms 
of financial and economic crime were from the outset closely tied with the 
Czech environment. They arose from ‘inside’ and were committed mostly 
by Czech offenders, though in many cases there were some international 
ramifications especially with respect to financial transactions. For a long 
time these activities were not presented as organised crime, even in cases 
where features of organised crime were apparent, including the use of 
violence. For example, the so-called light fuel oil cases. The base of these 
cases consisted of tax fraud taking advantage of loopholes in tax law and 
the incoherent regulation of the designation of oil products (Baloun and 
Scheinost, 2002). This activity produced enormous profit for perpetrators: 
it was based on the co-operation of suppliers, transporters, dealers and 
violence was used if needed especially inside the network against 
unreliable members, debtors etc.   
 
 




In order to trace the development of organised crime in the CR, especially 
with respect to criminal activities in the economic sphere, we can draw on 
regular expert surveys carried out annually since 1993. The panel of 
experts, ranging in size between 20 and 40, has been composed mostly of 
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police officers from specialised police units and within the last few years 
also included respondents from special tax service units. The survey has 
been part of research on organised crime carried out by the Institute of 
Criminology and Social Prevention. Of course, the results represent ‘soft 
data’, opinions of experts/practitioners, but at the same time it gives a 
picture of perceived trends in organised crime, as well as in the 
conceptualisation of this phenomenon. For comparison we may use data 
from 1993, 2009 and 2017 (Cejp, 2000; 2018). 
 One issue addressed in the surveys was the proportion of foreigners 
among offenders involved in organised crime. It may be surprising that 
throughout the entire period covered by the surveys, police experts 
estimated the shares of foreigners and Czech offenders to be about equal, 
with a slight prevalence of foreigners. However, Czech offenders were 
considered to be positioned more at the executing level.  
 In 2009 experts estimated that foreign participants comprised 55% and 
Czechs 45% of organised crime groups (percentage is given by the average 
of respondents estimation). In addition, they estimated that approximately 
half the groups are mixed, with almost one third composed entirely of 
foreigners, and only about a quarter with exclusively Czech membership. 
Among mixed groups, groups headed by foreigners and Czechs performing 
auxiliary roles were deemed to be in the majority by a small margin.  
 With regard to nationalities, according to the 2009 survey, Ukrainians 
and Russians were believed to be the two groups of foreigners most 
frequently involved in organised crime in the Czech Republic on a long-
term basis. After 2000, Vietnamese and Albanian nationals entered this 
segment, and their share has steadily increased. Since 1998, the relative 
representation of Chinese in this first group has declined somewhat. In the 
1990s, this group of strongly represented nationalities also included 
citizens of the former Yugoslavia. With the final disintegration of 
Yugoslavia into several smaller states, the share of Yugoslavs decreased 
significantly.  
 In 2017, experts estimated the share of foreigners to drop to 49% in 
comparison with 2009, the Czech forming 51% of the total number. With 
regard to the composition of criminal groups, estimates shifted even more 
clearly towards a prevalence of Czechs. Only 28% of groups were believed 
to be composed purely of foreigners, 21% mixed with a prevalence of 
foreigners, 21% mixed with a prevalence of Czechs, and 30% of the 
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organised groups composed exclusively of Czechs.  
 With regard to nationalities we again find in 2017 Vietnamese, 
Ukrainians, Russians and Albanians among the nationalities most 
frequently mentioned, followed by Slovaks, Bulgarians and Romanians. 
Of lesser importance are Poles, Serbs and Nigerians as well as Chinese 
whose estimated numbers continue to decline. 
 Overall, these results suggest that the proportion of Czech and foreign-
ers speaking of the offenders has been rather stable, but experts point out 
that in their opinion the share of pure or predominantly Czech groups is 
growing. After 2000 the most numerous nationalities (except the Czech) 
among offenders of organised crime have been consistently Vietnamese, 
Ukrainians, Russians and Albanians. The long-run tendency shows a rise 
of the share of Slovaks and Romanians, and within last years also Serbs. 
In contrast, the number of Bulgarians, Poles, Chinese and Nigerians has 
been decreasing (Cejp, 2018). 
 Apart from the national background of organised criminals the surveys 
sought to ascertain the opinion of experts on the most widespread forms of 
organised crime in the Czech Republic. The following table enables to 
compare at least roughly the development of typical and most widespread 
activities of organised crime in the CR according to the opinion of the ex-
perts. Table 1 presents the results of inquiries made in 1993, 2009 and 
2017. The column under the year 1993 shows the ranking of the activity in 
question speaking of prevalence in this year and then the shift in its ranking 
in 2009 and 2017 and, of course, the ranking of newly named activities in 
these years. 
 If we compare the expert opinions expressed from 1993 to 2009, it is 
obvious that the most widespread activity had consistently been car theft. 
The organisation of prostitution decreased; theft and trafficking in stolen 
art items decreased very rapidly. On the other side, the production, smug-















 rank rank rank 
Car theft 1-2 1-3 17-18 
Theft of art items 1-2 18-19 24-26 
Organising prostitution 3 12-16 17-18 
Tax, insurance, credit frauds 4-5 4-5 3-5 
Burglary 4-5 12-16 15-16 
Organising illegal migration 6 7-11 12 
Corruption 7-9 1-3 3-5 
Handling stolen goods 7-9 20-22 21 
Gambling 7-9 18-19 24-26 
Money laundering 10-12 1-3 2 
Extortion, racketeering 10-12 23-24 29-30 
Trafficking in drugs 10-12 4-5 1 
Banking frauds - 6 19 
Establishing fraudulent & fictitious companies - 7-11 3-5 
Credit card fraud  - 7-11 13-14 
Document counterfeiting - 7-11 9 
Abuse of computers for criminal activities - 7-11 7 
Misuse of EU funds - - 6 
Custom frauds - - 8 
Illegal producing and trafficking in alcohol 
and cigarettes 
- - 10-11 
Infringement of trade mark  - - 10-11 
 N = number of experts questioned in the respective year 
 
Even in 2009 we may see the increase of financial and economic crime in 
the form of tax, insurance, credit frauds and money laundering. The in-
crease of corruption is also visible. In 2009, missing from the ‘top ten’ are 
the organisation of prostitution, handling of stolen goods, gambling and 
racketeering. In their place we find abuse of computers, document coun-
terfeiting, establishing fraudulent companies, i.e. rather more qualified fi-
nancial or economic forms of crime. 
 In 2017, the first place is firmly held by trafficking in drugs, followed 
by money laundering. Next comes corruption together with various forms 
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of fraud at 3rd-5th place and partly of document counterfeiting in 9th place. 
It is important to notice that misuse of EU funds has, since 2013, ranked 
among the frequently mentioned activities. This year experts named some 
new activities such as illegal trade in pharmaceuticals and fictitious mar-
riages contracted in order to legalise the stay in the country. All these forms 
of law breaking are not at top positions but still worthy of mentioning. Ex-
perts also called attention to the activities connected with the illegal trade 
in protected plants and animals.  
 These changes could indicate how organised criminal groups replace 
certain operations as these become less lucrative in light of new, more at-
tractive opportunities. For example, thefts of works of art stood alongside 
car theft as one of the most common activities of organised crime in the 
first half of the 1990s. The more effective sophisticated registration of 
items of art and the cooperation of other European states probably led to 
the gradual decline of these crimes in the second half of the 1990s, and 
since 2000 they have fallen to a negligible level. Similarly, illegal migra-
tion declined. Violent crime against the public or even between criminal 
groups in connection with organised crime stepwise receded. Organised 
crime groups evidently make high profits in the easiest possible way 
through contacts, corruption and negotiation instead of violence. This is 
probably also one of the determinants of the shift of activities towards the 
economic and financial sphere (Cejp, 2018).  
 
b. Governmental reports 
 
The report on the security situation and public order in the CR is a docu-
ment drawn up each year by the Czech police and submitted to the govern-
ment and to the Parliament. Over the course of the last few years it has 
noted both a stabilisation of ‘traditional’ organised crime in the CR, ac-
companied by a slow decline of violent crime (murders, extortion, assault 
and injury), and a shift towards non-violent crime mostly of an economic 
character (tax fraud and evasion, credit fraud, computer crime, affecting of 
government and public contracts and subsidies, etc.). Domestic organised 
crime groups are in this report presented as those leading in the area of 
crime connected with public subsidies and public procurement. This stated 
general trend resonates with the notion of a close relationship of organised 
crime and the development of society and economy.  
249 
 
 If we reflect on the report from 2009, we see that it stated that among 
typical activities of organised crime in the CR are the production, distribu-
tion and trafficking in drugs, tax frauds, organising prostitution and illegal 
migration, money counterfeiting, infringement of trade marks, money 
laundering, corruption etc. It was mentioned that the Czech Security and 
Information Service paid attention to the attempts of representatives of 
criminal structures to influence the decisions of state administration and to 
establish connections to government officials at local, regional and central 
levels, and to engage in money laundering and investment of criminal as-
sets (Report on the security situation and public order 2009).  
 In 2013, this report speaks of a continuing trend of infiltration of organ-
ised crime into the area of legitimate business and public administration 
through establishing firms and companies built in order to cover financial 
machinations or installing own people to the key position in economic and 
state institutions. The decline of violent activities and growth of criminal 
economic activities was stated (Report on security situation and public or-
der, 2013). 
 The 2016 report states that Czech organised crime groups are effec-
tively embedded  in the economic environment and dispose  by high cor-
ruptive potential. These groups try to entangle into their activities  people 
at stable positions in economy and business. The report mentions a leading 
role of domestic groups especially in the crime connected with public pro-
curement and subsidies. Attempts to corrupt central as well as local public 
administration are characteristic, both for domestic and foreign groups 
(Report on security situation and public order, 2016). 
 The reports indicate the enormous profits generated from these kinds of 
economic crime in an organised and qualified way facilitated by entrepre-
neurial experience and accountancy qualification of perpetrators that al-
lows them to balance on the edge of the law and avoid the intervention 
from law enforcement authorities. Corruption is noted especially in con-
nection with contacts between entrepreneurs and officials especially with 
regard to the management of public property and public budgets (Report 





Changes in the character of organised crime 
 
Expertise and governmental reports allow for the monitoring of develop-
ments of the qualitative characteristics of organised crime. That enables 
the identification of some trends. There are roughly three basic categories 
that are discernible based on these trends. 
1. The first category pertains to changes in the overall nature and internal 
structures of organised crime; 
2. The second concerns the way organised crime has stabilised, expanded 
and become institutionalised; 
3. The third category points out to infiltration of organised crime into so-
cial structure and public administration. 
 
It was observed with regard to the first category that the social and eco-
nomic level of the organisations has increased. It is more sophisticated and 
efficient and encompasses more economic sectors. In addition to being bet-
ter organised than it once was, organised crime now has a better technology 
at its disposal and makes use of the Internet. There has been a significant 
increase in the wealth of the various groups involved. Individual groups 
have divided up the market in illegal goods and services between them-
selves. Organised crime is more dangerous than in the 1990s because those 
who control it are now more cloaked in anonymity and control crime indi-
rectly. Criminals are using increasingly sophisticated means to escape de-
tection.  
 The second category consists of changes in the way crimes are commit-
ted. In this respect, the activities of organised criminal groups make less 
obvious use of violence, concentrating instead on more economic crime 
and fraud, and more on corruption. The range of activity is expanding to 
embrace more economic areas. For example, illegal production and smug-
gling of alcohol and cigarettes, counterfeiting, and cyber-crime are grow-
ing. There is a risk of an increase in the illegal import and export of haz-
ardous waste, human trafficking for forced labour, abuse of EU funds and 
several other activities.  
 The third category involves changes related to the expansion of organ-
ised crime into social structures. It is reaching further into the public ad-
ministration and undertakes larger-scale activities in the economic sphere. 
It tries to establish contacts within the police and other security forces. 
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Profits from illegal activities are laundered in legal business operations. In 
this respect, organised crime is causing more damage and has a damaging 
effect on the economy. The fact that the perpetrators already occupy high 
positions in the business community, and have connections in politics, lo-
cal and regional administration, the media, etc., makes it difficult to detect 
their activities. The social level of activities also means that organised 
criminals can exploit their contacts in order to publicly discredit the au-
thorities involved in detecting and convicting them (Cejp and 
Scheinost,2012). 
 In relation to this development it is worth mentioning the term ‘godfa-
ther’ as it arose around the year 2010. A content analysis of newspapers 
produced by the Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention in 2011 
found a noteworthy shift in terminology and focus regarding the ‘face of 
suspect’. As indicated before, the term ‘organised crime’ itself has been 
used only rarely, and for the most part it was not used with regard to events 
involving Czech offenders. The term ‘mafia’ was likewise used only rarely 
in relation to specific cases. More typically it was applied to different lob-
bies and their attempts to influence the public administration. The term 
‘godfather’, however, was used frequently. Of course, it is a rather journal-
istic term, similar to ‘tunnelling’ the banks, companies and plants. (Baloun 
and Scheinost, 2002). It has not been used to designate a ‘supreme boss of 
a criminal organisation’ but as the denomination of a rich and powerful 
man capable of manipulating politics, at least at the local level. He has 
commonly been characterised as a ‘controversial entrepreneur’ – a busi-
nessman operating at the margins of the law and willing to go beyond if 
needed. It means in fact that the link of such an entrepreneur with criminal 
activities has not been established but is strongly presumed. Simply put, 
‘godfather’ indicates a strong man behind the political scene with a web of 
contacts to dubious and shady characters (Luptáková, 2011). 
 Over the past few years, this term has again dropped back in media us-
age and in the political jargon. But its frequency around 2010 referred to 
the growing attention paid to the risk of the public administration being 
influenced by well-connected ‘controversial entrepreneurs’. This direction 
of  attention prevailed the attention paid to the peril of ‘classical’ organised 
crime. The comparison of expertise and statements incorporated in the re-
ports on the security situation in the CR points to three basic conclusions: 
1. organised crime has been stabilised on the criminal scene;  
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2. its traditional forms did not disappear, only have been adapted to con-
ditions and opportunities for profit; 
3. a distinct shift of organised crime activities towards the licit economy 
and business has been observed.  
 
With regard to the second and third conclusion:  it seems that perpetrators 
of organised economic criminal activities stem probably not only from 
high qualified strata of typical ‘white collars’ but also from  ordinary  and 
originally not suspicious entrepreneurs that decided to use (rather misuse) 
the chances in the market. 
 It is possible to illustrate this intersection between economic and organ-
ised crime and the involvement of such a category of offenders by the ex-
ample of the so-called ‘alcohol affair’. This was analysed in the frame of 
research carried out by Tomáš Diviák at the Institute of Criminology and 
Social Prevention using the method of social network analysis (see e.g. 
Borgatti et al., 2013; Robins 2015; for an introduction to criminal networks 
see Diviák, 2018). Network is defined as: a set of nodes and ties among 
them when nodes represent members/participants and ties represents the 
relations and interactions among them. 
 The alcohol affair counted for one of the most serious criminal activities 
in the history of the CR. In the second half of 2012 it strongly affected the 
whole country: about 140 persons suffered serious health damage and more 
than 50 died as a consequence of consumption of alcohol contaminated by 
methanol. For the first time in history, the Czech government declared a 
temporary prohibition and control of all alcoholic beverages with an alco-
hol content by volume of over 20o. The prohibition was in effect during the 
time necessary to inspect all alcohol on the market (in shops, restaurants, 
bars, booths etc.). This also included a ban on all exports of these beverages 
abroad.  
 A broad network of perpetrators was discovered. About 70 persons 
were investigated. It was found that the active core of this network encom-
passed 32 persons. 
 There were two basic branches of the network. The first one was created 
by a long-term active criminal group that illegally produced and distributed 
untaxed alcohol. This illegal enterprise was covered by a legal firm; the 
members had their specific tasks. Leaders of this group did not hesitate to 
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use intimidation or even physical assault in order to gain illegal profit from 
untaxed alcohol. Nevertheless, their product was non-toxic. 
 The perpetrators joined in the second branch were connected to the first 
one. They purchased and used their illegal product but added to it metha-
nol. The leaders and their helpers prepared this deadly mixture and subse-
quently supplied it to small shopkeepers or directly to customers. These 
small distributors often did not know what they were in fact buying and 
selling – they ‘only’ accepted that they broke the tax regulations and traded 
or bought the cheaper products (tax fraud). Maybe the producers made a 
mistake; maybe they were not able to determine the amount of methanol, 
at least not in its lethal or seriously damaging quantity.  
 
Figure 1:  
Network representation 
 
Source: Diviák (2018) 
 
 The sociogram above shows the scheme and picture of this network. 
Both branches are clearly visible; the perpetrators with entrepreneurial ex-
perience are coloured red; the size of the nodes indicates the relative im-
portance of their position in the structure. As crucial aspect for the func-
tioning and collaboration of both branches seems to be the exclusive link 
between two main actors – other members of both branches did not keep 
any contact with individuals from the respective other branch. 
Furthermore, Diviák and colleagues (2019) found that this network didn’t 
fully realise its distributive potential and thus the damages done by the 
perpetrators could have been even more severe (Diviák, 2019). 
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 The case was qualified as ‘organised crime’ and was as such prosecuted 
and brought to trial. The punishments were adequate: the two main leaders 
from the second branch were sentenced to life imprisonment. The leader 





The concept of organised crime in the CR has undergone significant devel-
opments. Organised crime ‘old style’ with the ‘usual suspects’ is no longer 
the top problem and major source of concern, at least in comparison with 
the public opinion during the 1990s. The threat of organised crime, instead, 
is found in its economic and political influence. In this regard we may re-
mind the reader of the concept of the ‘godfather’ who due to his economic 
position and power is able to avoid law enforcement and manipulate dem-
ocratic mechanisms, thereby affecting policy making by public authorities. 
The official reports on the security situation do not use the term ‘godfather’ 
but the threat of the influence of organised crime operating in economic 
sectors is distinctly articulated. 
 Compared to the face of the stereotypical ‘organised criminal’ in the 
1990s – who was mostly a foreigner involved in trafficking in illegal 
goods, racketeering etc. with the tendency to violence – the imagery has 
definitely become less clear. There are offenders of ‘classical’ organised 
crime as they were before, there are also ‘new organised criminals’ acting 
as ‘normal’ entrepreneurs and ‘respectable citizens’. But their picture can-
not be identified with the picture of American gangster bosses from the 
1920s and 1930s. It is a matter of perspective what type of criminal is to 
be preferred: the drug trafficker acting in the shadows on the one side, or 
the influential entrepreneur and businessman acting publicly on the other 
side. Maybe this second type resembles the Russian or Ukrainian oligarchs, 
but the Czech situation is still not the comparable, considering their influ-
ence.  
 The public as it is mentioned above has not shown much eagerness to 
be informed about organised crime, which is remarkable: ‘organised 
crime’ is always good for the headlines. But the evolution of ‘organised 
crime’ toward its higher involvement in economic and  financial sectors 
evokes a growing mistrust in the honesty of the entrepreneurial class and 
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subsequently this ‘dim face’ of suspects undermines the trust in policy 
making and many official tasks carried out in the public sphere by office 
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